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Abstract 
An online survey among undergraduate macroeconomics instructors reveals that roughly 
half of them were scared when the crisis erupted and remain wary that more may be in the 
offing. As regards teaching, courses feature much the same lineups of models as they did 
before the crisis. A striking change concerns public debt dynamics, which receives much 
more emphasis. Regarding the finer fabric of undergraduate macro teaching, exciting things 
are going on. A host of topics related to financial markets has entered the curriculum, and 
there  is  more  interest  in  economic  history,  the  history  of  economic  thought  and  case 
studies. 
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After the U.S. subprime crisis erupted in late 2007, the most frightening downturn of the 
global economy loomed since the Great Depression. Many economists believed that this 
would and should trigger a fundamental shake-up and reorientation of their field in general, 
and of macroeconomics in particular. Not all thought so. But those who disagreed remained 
suspiciously silent. However, once it looked as though most countries might be spared the 
nightmare scenarios that many had feared, be it because or despite heavy government 
intervention in the form of stimulus packages and bailouts, the picture of a thoroughly divided 
profession emerged. On the defensive end of the spectrum, Stanford University's John Taylor 
(2010, p. 5) insisted: 
The recent crisis gives no reason to abandon the core empirical 'rational expectations/sticky price 
model' developed over the past 30 years - whether you call this type of model 'dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium', 'new Keynesian' or 'new neoclassical'. 
Representing the opposite extreme, Willem Buiter (2009) of the London School of Economics 
criticized: 
(T)he typical graduate macroeconomics and monetary economics training received at Anglo-
American universities during the past 30 years or so, may have set back by decades serious 
investigations of aggregate economic behaviour and economic policy-relevant understanding. 
Views of a more moderate, intermediate nature dominated the discussion, of course. But even 
these views displayed substantial variety, ranging from calls for modest amendments to 
dynamic general equilibrium models to the claim that everything we need to understand and 
deal with such crises is already there in the accumulated body of macroeconomic knowledge 
and only awaits reanimation.
1 Well-respected media outside academia chimed into this 
discussion, giving proof of a similarly wide array of opinions or conclusions, however. While 
a headline in The New York Times suggested the 'Ivory tower unswayed by crashing economy' 
(Cohen, March 1, 2009), The Economist (March 31, 2010) went with the subtitle 'The crisis is 
changing how macroeconomics is taught'. 

1 A few samples from that discussion illustrate the range of opinions. Lucas (2004) sets himself slightly apart 
from Taylor (2010) by conceding long before this recent crisis: "There is a residue of things that the theories 
embedded in general equilibrium dynamics do not let us think about. They don't let us think about the 1930s or 
about financial crises." Also conceding dents in the armor of macroeconomics while leaving it open how to 
repair, Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia and Mauro (2010) state: "The great moderation lulled macroeconomists in the 
belief that we knew how to conduct policy. The crisis forces us to question that assessment." The view that 
everything we need to know is there to be recovered has been expressed by Eichengreen (2009), who writes: 
"What got us into this mess [...] were not the limits of scholarly imagination [but] [...] a partial and blinkered 
reading of [the] literature." Finally, Gordon (2009) brings us back full circle to Buiter's position: "We are best 
served by applying 1978-era macro and forgetting most of the modern macro that has developed since." 2 
 
  The profession's response to the dramatic events that unfolded during 2007–2009, 
which in many experts' views were instrumental in triggering further upheavals such as 
Europe's sovereign debt crisis of 2010, may be evaluated in several ways. One may scrutinize 
macroeconomics policy itself, as conducted or recommended by governments, central banks 
and international institutions. Alternatively, one could look at postgraduate instruction and 
research published in learned journals to gauge the extent to which a true paradigm shift may 
be in the making. 
  The approach taken here is to focus on undergraduate macroeconomics. The 
motivation is that each year hundreds of thousands of undergraduate students take 
macroeconomics courses in North America and Europe alone. The expertise and perspectives 
they take from these courses may be expected to leave a lasting imprint on the approaches and 
preoccupations that shape their contributions and decisions during their subsequent 
professional careers.
2 The results to be presented here are derived from an online survey 
conducted among academics involved in the teaching of compulsory undergraduate 
macroeconomics courses in the U.S. and Western Europe. 
  Section 2 describes the set-up of the survey. Section 3 reports the perceptions and 
views of undergraduate macroeconomics instructors   on the crisis itself and on some key 
aspects of macroeconomics theory and policy. Section 4 conveys the survey results: What is 
included in today's undergraduate macroeconomics curriculum? What are the changes that 
were implemented in the wake of the Great Recession? Section 5 sums up and offers some 
interpretations and concluding comments. 
 
2. The Online Survey 
 
The survey was conducted online in November and December 2010. We emailed invitations 
to 768 instructors at 511 colleges and universities in Western Europe and the U.S. to 

2 In the U.S., about 25,000 bachelor's degrees in economics are awarded every year compared with 2,500 
master's degrees and some 1,000 doctor's degrees. See Snyder and Dillow (2010) for the numbers and Siegfried 
(2010) for an assessment and longer-run trends in the U.S. 
The instructors in our survey report to teach some 50,000 students in their mandatory macroeconomics courses. 
This may have to be discounted because of some double counting. But it also underestimates actual numbers 
significantly because for various reasons countries or universities were not included, courses or instructors could 
not be identified or instructors failed to respond. 3 
 
participate in a survey titled Teaching macroeconomics after the crisis.
3 A total of 259 
instructors completed the survey, which gave us a return rate of 34%. 
  The questionnaire comprised three distinct parts. Part A asked respondents for their 
perceptions of the crisis and their views on the state of macroeconomics and on key policy 
issues. Part B attempted to identify the main models that currently compose the core of 
undergraduate macroeconomics teaching and to find out whether the crisis has led to changes 
that are visible at this level of aggregation. Part C went into detail by asking whether the crisis 
rekindled interest in topics that had faded from the undergraduate curriculum   such as the 
liquidity trap   or pushed new topics and approaches into the syllabus that had surfaced 
during the crisis.
4 We also collected structural information about respondents, including their 
age groups, countries of residence and main fields of research. Finally, the questionnaire gave 
respondents the opportunity to augment their structured responses to our questions with 
feedback cast in their own words. 
 
3. Perceptions of Macroeconomic Theory, Policy and the Crisis 
 
The first set of questions attempts to attain general profiles of individual respondents, with a 
focus on their evaluations of the crisis and their views on modern macroeconomics and main 
policy issues. These questions do not directly relate to the contents of their undergraduate 
macroeconomics courses. The motivation here is that such general views may cause 
instructors to put a specific spin, consciously or subconsciously, on how they select and teach 
canonical models or concepts. 
 
3.1. Perceptions of the crisis 
Figure 1 shows that there is a distinctly bimodal distribution of opinions on how dangerous 
the crisis was when it erupted, and whether it continues to pose a threat today. 
 
  [Figure 1 near here] 
 

3 For details on how respondents were selected see the Appendix B. A static version of the questionnaire may be 
consulted at http://www.fgn.unisg.ch/public/questionnaire.pdf. 
4 Inspiration for the list of topics came from many panels on teaching macroeconomics after the financial crisis, 
such as those held at the American Economic Association meetings 2010 in San Francisco, and publications 
derived from these discussions such as Blinder (2010). 
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A total of 49% of undergraduate instructors agree or mostly agree with the judgment that 
'When Lehman Brothers collapsed the Western world was close to a complete economic 
breakdown' (north-west panel, gray bars). On the other side, 38% disagree or mostly disagree. 
Only 13% remain neutral on this issue.
5 In this case, average numbers conceal that agreement 
is noticeably higher in the U.S., where 54% agree, with only 33% disagreeing. The 
perceptions of instructors in Western Europe are split more evenly, with 45% agreeing and 
42% disagreeing. Instructors at the top 40 research universities (north-east panel) seem to 
hold slightly more extreme views than do the rest. 
  The graphs on the bottom row of Figure 1 show responses to the statement 'From an 
international perspective, the worst part of the crisis is over.' Given that many European 
economies, and their labor markets in particular, seem to have weathered the first thrust of the 
storm much better than has the U.S., it may come as a surprise that European instructors are 
more skeptical than are their U.S. counterparts. By contrast, the sovereign debt crisis that has 
started to haunt the Eurozone in particular, and which many regard as a direct consequence of 
the financial crisis, may have made Europeans more wary about what might still be in store. 
In numbers, 51% of U.S. instructors believe or tend to believe that the crisis is over. Only 
31% of Europeans share this view, while a majority disagrees or tends to disagree. 
 
3.2. On modern macroeconomics 
The divided views regarding the seriousness and diligence of the financial crisis, as observed 
similarly on both sides of the Atlantic, do not appear to translate into divided views on the 
state of modern macroeconomics. Only 10% of undergraduate macroeconomics instructors 
really believe that everything is fine in the sense that 'modern macroeconomics possesses the 
models and concepts needed to understand and deal with such crises'. A majority of 72% 
thinks that 'modern macroeconomics provides a useful framework, though the crisis revealed 
deficiencies that need to be addressed'. Nevertheless, a sizable minority of 17% concludes that 
we need a completely new paradigm. Not unexpectedly, this skepticism is shared by only 6% 
of undergraduate teachers at our top research universities. 
 
  [Figure 2 near here] 
 

5 In some of the figures and tables presented in this paper, percentages may not add up to 100 because some 
instructors did not respond.  
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Even though these numbers depict undergraduate instructors as a quite homogeneous group, 
the middle option, which most respondents ticked, is fairly broad, of course, and may include 
diverse opinions on what the deficiencies of modern macroeconomics are and how they 
should be addressed. 
 
3.3. On macroeconomic policy 
Figure 3 reports views on what governments and central banks can and should do to combat 
or avert financial crises. The big news is that there is a substantial level of agreement among 
respondents, and little difference between Europe and the U.S. or top-ranked universities and 
the rest. 
 
  [Figure 3 near here] 
 
  Presenting statements in the order in which they were listed in the questionnaire, 76% 
of respondents agree or tend to agree that bailouts may be necessary to contain financial 
crises, while a mere 14% disagree or tend to disagree. In a similar vein, 83% of respondents 
(tend to) disagree with the statement that governments should simply let markets run their 
course when financial crises loom. Only 14% would (tend to) subscribe to this 
recommendation. 
  The call for a tighter regulation of financial markets is the most uniformly agreed 
proposition. A majority of 86% of undergraduate teachers thinks so, and merely 8% oppose. 
  The final two questions in this segment address fiscal and monetary policy. Here also, 
sizable majorities share the view that each one 'is an essential tool to mitigate economic 
downturns'. Approval ratings are similar, being 77% for fiscal policy and 83% for monetary
policy. Unexpectedly, perhaps, at 84% the highest approval rating is handed to fiscal policy 
by instructors at top universities. The fact that fiscal and monetary policy are seen more or 
less at eye level is surprising given that these days about four times as many published papers 
in learned journals deal with monetary policy compared with fiscal policy issues, while some 





6 See Wolfers (2009), in particular the chart included in this Freakonomics post.  
 
 
Figure 3. C Regarding policy measures: 
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4. Undergraduate macroeconomics today 
 
Having assembled a crude understanding of how survey respondents view the crisis, related 
policy options and the state of macroeconomics in general, we now turn to the contents of 
their mandatory undergraduate macroeconomics curricula. 
 
4.1. Major models and concepts: taking stock and assessing change 
In a first step, we look at the concepts and models that form the backbone of what 
undergraduate students learn these days about the macroeconomy. Suggested candidates are 
the names that are traditionally associated with undergraduate teaching, plus the mainstays of 
macroeconomic research conducted during the past three decades, ranging from the 
Keynesian cross and the IS-LM model at one end to real business cycles and overlapping 
generations models on the other. 
 
4.1.1. A snapshot of the post-crisis curriculum 
Figure 4 shows whether respondents teach the model in their own course(s) (black bar), 
whether it is covered in some other mandatory macroeconomics course (gray bar) or whether 
it is not part of the mandatory curriculum at all (white bar).
7 Models are ranked according to 
the percentage of programs that cover them in the mandatory curriculum (i.e. sum of black 
and gray bars). 
 
  [Figure 4 near here] 
 
  In intermediate macroeconomics, the lingua franca for discussing short-run issues 
appears to be the aggregate demand/aggregate supply model. The mandatory curriculum 
includes this almost universally, in 97% of all cases. A mere six instructors report that it is not 
covered at their institutions. Interestingly, a smaller percentage teaches the very concepts that 
are typically thought to provide the underpinnings of the AD-AS model. Regarding aggregate 
demand, 94% cover the Keynesian cross and 92% teach the IS-LM model. As a backbone for 
aggregate supply, the labor market is a mandatory topic in 94% of curricula. 
  Expanded versions of IS-LM that include open economy aspects or the recent shift of 
monetary policy towards rules have made their ways into undergraduate macroeconomics 
teaching, being mandatory in 76% and 69% of the programs, respectively. There is a 
































































significant transatlantic divide, however. While the Mundell–Fleming model is taught at 92% 
of European universities, it shows up in no more than 53% of U.S. programs. Similarly, the 
IS-MP model, the one with the policy rule, advocated by authors such as Romer (2000) and 
Walsh (2002), features in 90% of pertinent European bachelor programs, whereas only 55% 
of U.S. programs are reported to cover it. 
  Recent alternatives to the AD-AS model are also making a presence in undergraduate 
teaching. One is the New Keynesian Philips curve, which is taught in 77% of all programs. 
Another is the real business cycle approach, which 69% of applicable curricula include. 
Differences between Europe and the U.S. and between top universities and others are minor. 
As a final concept for the short run, 66% of all programs make economic policy an 
endogenous part of their models. 
  Turning to models and concepts for the long run, the neoclassical growth model takes 
the role that the AD-AS model plays for short-run analysis. A majority of 93% of all programs 
report to include it, with little variation across continents or institutions. Endogenous growth 
models do lag behind, but nevertheless have a strong aggregate showing; in Europe even more 
so than elsewhere, with 83% of programs including it. The respective number in the U.S. is 
64%. There is also a substantial difference between top universities, of which only 12% report 
not to teach it, whereas 25% of the others do pass. 
  Public debt dynamics, which provides a link between stimulus packages and sovereign 
debt issues, is a mandatory topic in 71% of undergraduate economics majors. Possibly as a 
reflex of Europe's sovereign debt crisis that started with Greece in 2009, 77% of European 
universities cover it, while only 65% do so in the U.S. The final topic on our list, the 
overlapping generations model, is mandatory in a minority of programs only (44%). Again, 
Europe is in the lead, with 53% of universities finding the space or seeing the need to include 
it. In the U.S., only students in 27% of pertinent bachelor programs encounter it as a 
mandatory topic. 
  According to this section's results, curricula continue to feature a quite orthodox 
selection of unifying core topics. But topics that have set the tone for a few generations of 
young researchers are also making a presence, if not in their full formal clothes. As a rule, 
European universities find more space and motivation to include such recent models, as well 
as more demanding variations of established models. 
 
  8 
 
4.1.2. Has the crisis affected the curriculum? 
Next, instructors were asked whether and how the coverage of the models they teach has 
changed after the financial crisis. The results are given in Table 1, with models presented in 
the same order as in Figure 4.
8 
 
  [Table 1 near here] 
 
The model or concept that records the biggest boost by some margin is public debt dynamics. 
While only 4% of instructors have added it as a new topic, another 50% have expanded its 
coverage. This is put into perspective, though, by the fact reported in Figure 4 that still only 
71% of programs cover it in the mandatory curriculum. The intensified interest in this topic is 
no puzzle. More of a surprise, perhaps, is the increased emphasis on the related topics of the 
IS-MP model and on endogenous macroeconomics policymaking in general. The net balance 
in these two cases, defined as the difference between those who added or expanded coverage 
and those who reduced it, is 26% and 23%, respectively. 
  Most other concepts also enjoy a positive net balance, although more modest ones. 
The only net losers are models of economic growth; both in neoclassical and endogenous 
guise, as almost a 10th of all respondents declare that they reduced coverage. In the case of 
endogenous growth models, this is entirely owing to the negative net balance in the U.S., 
which outweighs the positive net balance in European countries. A similar transatlantic divide 
is revealed with respect to overlapping generations models, for which Europe tallies a net 
balance of 25% and the U.S. one of  10%. The only two other models where the crisis had a 
noticeably different effect on both sides of the Atlantic are the Mundell–Fleming model and 
endogenous macroeconomic policymaking. The much higher European net balances help 
explain the observation reported in Figure 4 that a substantially larger percentage of European 
programs feature these models in the first place. 
  Being asked whether the models they do not teach now were dropped after the crisis, 





8 Here and below: when numbers for 'top' universities and the 'rest' are omitted this means that differences were 
not noteworthy. 
9 In a majority of cases, less than a handful of instructors say they dropped the model. Exceptions are: real 
business cycles (dropped by eight instructors; or 5% of those who do not teach it), endogenous macroeconomic 
policy (7; 5%), endogenous growth (7; 4%), neoclassical growth (6; 7%) and OLG models (5; 2%).  
 
Table 1. C  Concerning the topics that you teach. Have they been added or  
















   Europe 
   U.S. 
1.29 
   0.81 
   1.83 
15.52 
   16.26 
   14.68 
76.29 
   74.80 
   77.98 
1.29 
   0.00 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
0.49 
   0.87 
   0.00 
17.65 
   17.39 
   17.98 
74.51 
   74.78 
   74.16 
3.43 
   3.48 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
0.50 
   0.92 
   0.00 
12.94 
   11.01 
   15.22 
80.60 
   84.40 
   76.09 
2.99 
   0.92 
   5.43 
Neoclassical growth models 
 
All 
   Europe 
   U.S. 
1.13 
   1.09 
   1.18 
3.95 
   6.52 
   1.18 
82.49 
   81.52 
   83.53 
8.47 
   6.52 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
0.52 
   0.88 
   0.00 
22.28 
   24.78 
   18.75 
68.39 
   69.03 
   67.50 
4.15 
   1.77 
   7.50 
New Keynesian Philips curve 
 
All 
   Europe 
   U.S. 
0.00 
   0.00 
   0.00 
16.08 
   14.86 
   17.39 
75.52 
   74.32 
   76.81 
3.5 
   4.05 




   Europe 
   U.S. 
1.47 
   2.08 
   0.00 
13.97 
   15.63 
   10.00 
77.94 
   76.04 
   82.50 
1.47 
   1.04 
   2.50 
Endogenous growth models 
 
All 
   Europe 
   U.S.l 
1.02 
   1.96 
   0.00 
5.10 
   9.80 
   0.00 
82.65 
   82.35 
   82.98 
8.16 
   1.96 
   14.89 




   Europe 
   U.S. 
3.97 
   4.76 
   3.17 
50.00 
   55.56 
   44.44 
38.10 
   33.33 
   42.86 
1.59 
   0.00 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
4.0 
   2.5 
   6.67 
27.2 
   27.5 
   26.67 
59.2 
   61.25 
   55.56 
4.8 
   3.75 
   6.67 




   Europe 
   U.S. 
4.08 
   5.00 
   3.45 
14.29 
   15.00 
   13.79 
67.35 
   65.00 
   68.97 
9.18 
   10.00 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
1.74 
   1.89 
   1.61 
22.61 
   28.3 
   17.74 
66.96 
   64.15 
   69.35 
1.74 
   0.00 
   3.23 





  Europe 
   U.S. 
6.90 
   5.00 
   1.11 
13.79 
   20.00 
   0.00 
72.41 
   70.00 
   77.78 
3.45 
   0.00 
   11.11 
 9 
 
4.1.3. A look at the big picture 
To complete the big picture we asked instructors about their emphases on microfoundations 
and on the short versus the long run. Figure 5 (top row) shows which percentage of the course 
devoted to macroeconomics models with strict microfoundations. 
 
  [Figure 5 near here] 
  
  There is little difference between Europe and the U.S., and between top universities 
and others. Some 10% do not teach such models at all. A clear majority attributes up to 25% 
of the course to microfounded models. In just over 10% of the courses, models with 
microfoundations dominate the syllabus. One difference that jumps out is that only 4% of 
mandatory macroeconomics courses at top universities ignore micro-based models altogether, 
whereas at other universities 11% of the courses do. 
  Regarding change, some 80% say that the weight on models with microfoundations 
has not changed since the crisis. About 10% say it has increased and close to 5% say it has 
reduced. Again, 14% of top universities report an increase, while the number for other 
universities is much lower at 7%. 
  The bottom row in Figure 5 indicates the percentage of a course 'devoted to models 
and concepts dealing with short-run phenomena'. On aggregate, 44% of instructors say they 
devote up to 50% of their courses to short-run phenomena; 46% devote more than half of their 
courses. Here, patterns are also similar between Europe and the U.S. and between differently 
ranked universities. Asked about change, about 70% of instructors did not change weights; 
however, 15% say they increased emphasis on short-run models (Europe: 13%; U.S.: 18%), 
while some 9% decreased it. 
  The bottom line in this section, as regards the impact of the crisis, seems to be a 
modest move in undergraduate macroeconomics towards more emphasis on microfoundations 
and on short-run perspectives. 
 
4.2. A more detailed picture: new concepts 
Next, the questionnaire moved beyond the big picture by asking which ones from a list of 




10 Our list bears a close relationship with the topics discussed in Blinder (2010), not least because we augmented 
our initial list with some of his suggestions. Figure 5. C Completing the big picture. 
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4.2.1. A snapshot of finer topics 
Figure 6 displays the answers, listing those new topics first that received the highest yes 
shares among all respondents. 
 
  [Figure 6 near here] 
 
  The winner from this list is, by a narrow margin, banks and other financial 
institutions. This topic is covered in 78% of all courses; even in 87% in the U.S., where many 
see the roots of the financial crisis. The runner-up is the liquidity trap (77%); certainly not a 
new concept, by any means, but one that had faded from the radar of many undergraduate 
teachers and from intermediate macroeconomics textbooks.
11 Again, a much larger share of 
instructors in the U.S. (85%) includes such a discussion compared with Europe (71%). With a 
substantial gap, bank runs come in at third place with 64%. The pattern is repeated: a 
whopping 86% of U.S. courses discuss bank runs, but only 45% do so in Europe. Other topics 
included in more than half of the courses are non-conventional monetary policy (e.g. 
quantitative easing) (63%), bubbles in asset markets (56%) and risk premiums (54%). The 
Atlantic divide strikes again in the case of quantitative easing (78% versus 51% in favor of 
the U.S.) and bubbles (71% versus 45%), whereas the coverage of risk premiums is similar. 
  A minority of instructors admits to covering international financial contagion (47%), 
multiple interest rates (47%), systemic risk (46%), insolvency and illiquidity (46%), leverage 
(41%) and securitization (37%). Here too, coverage is consistently higher in the U.S., with 
multiple interest rates (62% versus 34%) and insolvency (59% versus 35%) being the most 
outstanding examples. 
  Only a relatively small minority reports to include rating agencies (26%), derivatives 
and other structured products (25%) and bonus payments (14%), with minor transatlantic 
differences. 
 
4.2.2. Has the crisis affected the finer fabric macroeconomics courses are made of ? 
Figure 7 reports whether the crisis brought any changes regarding the topics listed in Figure 6. 
Keeping the order of topics as in Figure 6, the new figure reveals a substantial amount of 
change. For all but two topics, a majority of respondents who teach a given topic indicates 

11 Textbooks that did not feature liquidity traps before the crisis include successful intermediate texts such as 
Barro (1997), Burda and Wyplosz (2001), Farmer (1999), Jones (2008) and Mankiw (2006). Others, which 
include Williamson (2005), do mention the concept but waste but a few sentences to discard it as irrelevant. Figure 6. − Which of these topics do you cover in your mandatory macroeconomics course(s)? 
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that this has been added or given expanded coverage since the crisis. The two exceptions are 
risk premiums, which 14% have added after the crisis and where 31% have increased the 




  [Figure 7 near here] 
 
  Non-conventional monetary policy (e.g. quantitative easing) has received the biggest 
boost from the crisis. Almost half of the instructors who teach it have added this topic to their 
syllabuses after the crisis and another 34% have expanded its coverage.
13 Other hot topics in 
undergraduate macroeconomics appear to be bubbles (added by 30%; expanded by 47%), 
securitization (44% and 33%), rating agencies (46% and 31%), leverage (44% and 32%) and 
systemic risk (30% and 41%). Even the least 'dynamic' concepts under this definition, risk 
premiums and multiple interest rates, have only recently been added by 14% and 13% of 
those who teach it. 
 
4.2.3. Why are certain topics left out? 
An oftentimes substantial percentage of undergraduate instructors decided not to teach certain 
concepts listed in Figures 6 and 7, ranging from 19% who do not cover banks and other 
financial intermediaries to 80% who leave out bonus payments. The questionnaire asked them 
for the reasons. The options offered were: 'Covered in other mandatory course', 'Does not 
belong in macro course', 'Not covered in pertinent textbooks', 'Too difficult for this level' and 
'Lack of time'. 
  There is no clear picture and no dominant reason. Different topics are excluded for 
different reasons. At an aggregate level, adding up percentages across all topics, the reason 
most often cited (by 30% of those who do not teach a subject) is that it does not belong in a 
macroeconomics course. A close second is 'lack of time', mentioned by 27%. Compared with 
Europe, almost twice as many U.S. respondents blame lack of time for not including a subject 
(37% versus 22%). Instead, a noticeably smaller percentage argues that topics do not belong 
in a macro course (25% versus 32%), pointing to a wider, possibly less dogmatic definition of 

12 This may be a bit surprising since risk premiums feature on Blinder's (2010) list of 'New topics for macro 
principles'. After asking rhetorically "how can we continue to teach the one-interest-rate model?", Blinder (2010) 
even claims that whether or not to include multiple interest rates is one of the 'Four basic pedagogical decisions' 
that need to be taken. 
13 This may not be such a surprise. A check at www.google.com/trends reveals that 'quantitative easing' did not 
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the field. The fact that a topic is not covered in pertinent textbooks is the least frequently cited 
reason (11%) among all instructors, and is only mentioned by 3% of those who teach at top 
universities. 
  A look at the individual topics (see Table A.1 in the Appendix) reveals some obvious 
contradictions or differences in judgment within the profession. For example, the main reason 
given by those who do not include asset market bubbles is that the topic does not belong in an 
undergraduate macroeconomics course (28%). By contrast, a majority of 56% of instructors 
actually includes this topic in their macro courses, as we learned from Figure 6. In addition, 
the main reason at 24% for not including multiple interest rates in a macroeconomics course 
is that it is considered 'too difficult', while Figure 6 states that 47% of undergraduate 
instructors manage to teach it nonetheless. 
  
4.2.4. How are core models and topics presented and packaged? 
A final topical question attempted to find out in which way the models, concepts and topics 
that are addressed in the mandatory curriculum are presented and put in perspective by 
drawing on lessons and methods from statistics, mathematics, case studies, economic history, 
behavioral economics or the history of economic thought. Table 2 reveals that instructors 
draw on these fields to a perhaps surprising extent, and, as a tendency, more so than before 
the crisis. 
 
  [Table 2 near here] 
 
  The clear favorite, which only one out of five instructors reports to avoid, is 
mathematical modeling. But this is also the only item on the list with a negative balance, since 
only 2% have attributed more emphasis to it after the crisis, while 9% grant less. Another 
minority of 23% avoids statistical/empirical applications, but the net balance is positive in 
this case, pointing towards increased emphasis. Behavioral economics finishes last at 64%, 
but records a distinctly positive net balance of 8%. The biggest winners from the crisis on this 
measure, however, are economic history and case studies to which 22% and 19% of 
instructors award more emphasis than they did before the crisis, respectively. 
  Again, there is rather little difference in how much instructors in Europe draw on these 
methods or fields relative to their counterparts in the U.S. when they teach undergraduate 
macroeconomics. If anything, Europeans appear to have a relative preference for case studies, 
which they employ more frequently and more often with increased emphasis than do their  
 



















History of economic thought 
 
All 
   Europe 
   U.S. 
11.97 
   13.99 
   9.48 
43.63 
   38.46 
   50.00 
5.02 
   4.90 
   5.17 
0.39 
   0.70 
   0.00 
 
35.52 
   37.06 






   Europe 
   U.S. 
10.81 
   10.49 
   11.21 
16.99 
   15.38 
   19.87 
2.70 
   3.50 
   1.72 
0.39 
   0.70 
   0.00 
 
63.71 
   62.94 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
18.53 
   23.78 
   12.07 
34.75 
   34.97 
   34.48 
5.41 
   4.90 
   6.03 
0.77 
   1.40 
   0.00 
 
36.68 
   29.37 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
10.01 
   13.99 
   5.17 
54.05 
   53.15 
   55.17 
6.18 
   4.20 
   8.62 
0.39 
   0.70 
   0.00 
 
23.17 
   18.88 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
1.93 
   2.80 
   0.86 
62.55 
   63.64 
   61.21 
9.27 
   11.19 
   6.90 
0.77 
   1.40 
   0.00 
 
20.85 
   13.99 




   Europe 
   U.S. 
21.62 
   22.38 
   20.69 
42.47 
   36.36 
   50.00 
4.25 
   3.50 
   5.17 
0.77 
   1.40 
   0.00 
 
27.41 
   31.47 
   22.41 
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U.S. counterparts. The same holds for statistical and empirical applications. U.S. instructors 
more frequently draw on lessons from economic history or the history of economic thought. 
 
 
5. Summary and concluding comments 
 
When the perfect storm brewed in 2008, many thought that this experience might leave no 
stone standing in the field of macroeconomics. This has not happened. Not least because the 
storm was eventually downgraded to a level 4 hurricane that did not cause the economic 
damage we initially feared it might. 
  Results from our online survey reveal that roughly half of all undergraduate instructors 
were really scared when the storm broke, and a similar percentage remains wary that more 
and worse may come from where the initial storm hatched. 
  Results also suggest that our key question of whether the crisis has changed how 
macroeconomics is taught in bachelor programs East and West of the Atlantic must be 
answered on an aggregate and on a more detailed level. 
  When we look at the big picture, at the key models used to discuss issues of economic 
growth and business cycles, change is modest at best. From such a bird's eye perspective, 
courses feature very much the same lineups of models as they did before the crisis. There is 
some evidence of a little more emphasis on short-run issues versus long-run topics after the 
crisis, and on microfounded models versus their Keynesian-type alternatives. But these 
changes look evolutionary rather than abrupt. The only major change on this level is related to 
public debt dynamics, which receives a lot more emphasis than it did before the financial 
crisis, and its reverberations, say in the form of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
  Upon closer scrutiny, however, when we look at the finer fabric undergraduate 
macroeconomics teaching is made of, exciting things are going on indeed. First, a host of 
topics that are related to financial markets and that gained or regained prominence during the 
Great Recession have either entered the curriculum for the first time or now play a much more 
prominent role. These range from familiar or straightforward topics such as asset bubbles and 
liquidity traps to rather unexpected arrivals such as leverage and bonus payments, which one 
would not have anticipated in a macro course a few years ago. Second, there is an intensified 
interest in putting macroeconomics into a wider and real-world context, making instructors 
reach more often for lessons from economic history and case studies. 14 
 
  There are few differences when we compare Europe with the U.S., or check whether 
universities that excel in research are drifting away from the others. One pronounced 
difference is that U.S. undergraduate majors in economics are mandated a more spartan menu 
of key models and concepts than are their European peers. These menus often avoid 
extensions that may complicate matters too much, such as opening the economy or including 
policy rules. In return, and this is the second significant difference, U.S. undergraduate majors 
are treated to a much richer and fresher set of trimmings. It seems as though this simpler set 
of key models, which U.S. instructors tend to rely on, makes it easier or leaves more space for 
the speedy introduction and discussion of entirely new topics, as suggested by the dramatic 
developments of 2007 2009. 
Remembering the shockwaves that the crisis sent through our profession, and noting 
the widespread and continuing fear that the global economy might not be safe yet, it may 
appear odd, or even a failure, to see instructors hang onto very much the same models that 
they taught before the crisis. Key reasons for this may be that no alternative paradigm is in 
sight that could be used in undergraduate teaching or that most instructors remain convinced 
that research can address the enormous challenges posed by recent developments within 
established frameworks. This apparent persistence must not be confused with 'business as 
usual', as our introductory New York Times quote speculated. Within the time-honored agenda 
and models of undergraduate macroeconomics, instructors have become extremely busy and 
creative in revamping their courses, both by paying more attention to the lessons taught by 
real-world developments and history and by giving financial markets the weight that these 
possess in today's global economy. Past generations of students may well feel comfortably at 
home when they read the main labels at the doors of today's undergraduate macroeconomics 




A. Why instructors refrain from teaching certain topics 
The following table provides details on the reasons that instructors give for not covering 
specific topics. 
 
  [Table A.1 near here] 
 
 
B. Survey design 
The survey was conducted online during November and December 2010. For a static version 
of the questionnaire see http://www.fgn.unisg.ch/public/questionnaire.pdf. Invitations were 
sent by email to 768 undergraduate macroeconomics instructors at 511 colleges and 
universities in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the U.S.. Of those who 
were invited, 259 instructors completed the survey, which provides us with an overall return 
rate of 34%. 
Instructors were identified in two steps. First, we identified institutions of higher 
education, typically colleges and universities, that offer a bachelor's program with a major in 
economics. Second, we searched the websites of these institutions for academic staff involved 
in teaching mandatory macroeconomics courses at the bachelor's level. In Europe, we 
included all institutions in the selected countries. In the U.S., where a much larger number of 
pertinent institutions exists, we chose a random sample out of the 752 colleges listed in the 
College Navigator of the U.S. Department of Education to match the number of European 
institutions. 
Both for Western Europe and the U.S. the 40 best research universities, as identified 
by Coupé (2003), were included and tagged in order to permit discrimination between 'top' 
universities and the 'rest' in our analysis. 
Out of the 259 instructors who completed the survey, 143 (54%) teach in Western 
Europe, of which 24 (9%) teach at a top European university, 116 (45%) teach in the U.S. and 
27 (11%) of those teach at a top U.S. university. Figure A.1 shows the origins of the European 
survey participants. Figure A.2 shows the age distribution of all participants (missing answers 
are not included). 
 Table A.1. − Considering the topics you do not teach. What are the main reasons for   not teaching them? 
 
Topic   Sample  Covered in other 
mandatory  
macro course 
Does not belong 
in mandatory 
macro course 
Not covered in 
pertinent macro 
textbooks 
Too difficult for 
this level 
Lack of time 
Banks and  




   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
29.17 
   29.41 
   28.57 
   58.33 
   19.44 
22.92 
   29.41 
   7.14 
   8.33 
   27.78 
8.33 
   5.88 
   14.29 
   0.00 
   11.11 
12.50 
   11.76 
   14.29 
   8.33 
   13.89 
25.00 
   20.59 
   35.71 
   25.00 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
18.00 
   26.47 
   0.00 
   50.00 
   7.89 
16.00 
   14.71 
   18.75 
   16.67 
   15.79 
8.00 
   8.82 
   6.25 
   0.00 
   10.53 
18.00 
   17.65 
   18.75 
   16.67 
   18.42 
38.00 
   32.35 
   50.00 
   16.67 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
17.50 
   18.18 
   14.29 
   43.75 
   10.94 
30.00 
   30.30 
   28.57 
   12.50 
   34.38 
11.25 
   12.12 
   7.14 
   0.00 
   14.06 
10.00 
   9.09 
   14.29 
   18.75 
   7.81 
27.50 
   25.76 
   35.71 
   25.00 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
11.76 
   12.90 
   8.70 
   33.33 
   8.22 
20.00 
   20.97 
   17.93 
   8.33 
   21.92 
21.18 
   25.81 
   8.70 
   0.00 
   24.66 
10.59 
   9.68 
   13.04 
   8.33 
   10.96 
31.76 
   25.81 
   47.83 
   41.67 
   30.14 




   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
16.83 
   21.43 
   6.45 
   27.27 
   13.92 
27.72 
   28.57 
   25.81 
   31.82 
   26.58 
8.91 
   7.14 
   12.90 
   4.55 
   10.13 
19.8 
   21.43 
   16.13 
   13.64 
   21.52 
24.75 
   18.57 
   38.71 
   22.73 




   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
22.43 
   31.58 
   12.00 
   45.45 
   16.47 
23.36 
   22.81 
   24.00 
   18.18 
   24.71 
10.28 
   7.02 
   14.00 
   4.55 
   11.76 
14.95 
   17.54 
   12.00 
   13.64 
   15.29 
27.10 
   17.54 
   38.00 
   18.18 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
17.07 
   21.21 
   12.28 
   27.27 
   14.85 
21.14 
   25.76 
   15.79 
   27.27 
   19.80 
6.50 
   9.09 
   3.51 
   4.55 
   6.93 
16.26 
   19.70 
   12.28 
   22.73 
   14.85 
34.96 
   18.18 
   54.39 
   18.18 





   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
12.70 
   14.29 
   9.52 
   22.22 
   10.10 
19.84 
   21.43 
   16.67 
   14.81 
   21.21 
10.32 
   10.71 
   9.52 
   3.70 
   12.12 
23.81 
   22.62 
   26.19 
   25.93 
   23.23 
30.95 
   28.57 
   35.71 
   33.33 




   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
13.95 
   18.18 
   7.69 
   24.00 
   11.54 
23.26 
   27.27 
   17.31 
   16.00 
   25.00 
17.05 
   15.58 
   19.23 
   12.00 
   18.27 
15.50 
   12.99 
   19.23 
   16.00 
   15.38 
27.13 
   22.08 
   34.62 
   28.00 
   26.92 




   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
12.00 
   13.58 
   9.09 
   19.23 
   10.10 
34.40 
   38.28 
   27.27 
   26.92 
   36.36 
11.20 
   9.88 
   13.64 
   0.00 
   14.14 
12.00 
   12.35 
   11.36 
   19.23 
   10.10 
27.20 
   22.22 
   36.36 
   34.62 




   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
11.33 
   10.99 
   11.86 
   24.00 
   8.80 
40.67 
   46.15 
   32.20 
   36.00 
   41.60 
10.00 
   9.89 
   10.17 
   0.00 
   12.00 
19.33 
   15.38 
   25.43 
   24.00 
   18.40 
16.67 
   15.38 
   18.64 
   16.00 




   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
9.04 
   12.12 
   5.13 
   17.14 
   7.04 
41.81 
   44.44 
   38.46 
   37.14 
   62.96 
12.43 
   13.13 
   11.54 
   5.71 
   14.08 
9.04 
   9.09 
   8.97 
   14.29 
   7.75 
25.99 
   18.18 
   35.90 
   25.71 
   26.06 
Derivatives and  




   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
12.71 
   14.71 
   10.13 
   21.62 
   10.42 
39.78 
   45.10 
   32.91 
   37.84 
   40.28 
7.73 
   7.84 
   7.59 
   0.00 
   9.72 
17.68 
   14.71 
   21.52 
   13.51 
   18.75 
20.99 
   15.69 
   27.85 
   27.03 
   19.44 
Bonus payments  All 
   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
14 
   8.33 
   5.00 
   12.20 
   5.39 
50.00 
   51.85 
   48.00 
   43.90 
   51.50 
9.62 
   9.26 
   10.00 
   9.76 
   9.58 
5.77 
   4.63 
   7.00 
   9.76 
   4.79 
25.00 
   22.22 
   28.00 
   21.95 
   25.75 
Leverage All 
   Europe 
   U.S. 
   Top 
   Rest 
11.35 
   13.95 
   7.27 
   21.43 
   8.85 
34.04 
   38.37 
   27.27 
   32.14 
   34.51 
12.06 
   12.79 
   10.91 
   7.14 
   13.27 
13.47 
   10.47 
   18.18 
   14.29 
   13.27 
26.95 
   20.93 
   36.36 
   25.00 
   27.43 
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[Figure A.1 near here] 
 
[Figure A.2 near here]    
Figure A.1. C The countries of residence of European participants 
 
   






Blanchard, Olivier, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia and Paolo Mauro (2010). Rethinking macro policy.  
Retrieved from http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4617, February 9, 2011. 
 
Barro, Robert J. (1997). Macroeconomics. 5th ed. MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass. 
 
The Economist (2010). Revise and resubmit: The crisis is changing how macroeconomics is 
taught. March 31. 
 
Blinder, Alan (2010). Teaching Macro Principles After the Financial Crisis. Journal of 
Economic Education, October-December: 385–390. 
 
Buiter, Willem H. (2009). The unfortunate uselessness of most 'state of the art' academic 
monetary economics, Retrieved from http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3210, 
February 9, 2011. 
 
Burda, Michael and Charles Wyplosz (2001). European Macroeconomics. 2nd ed. Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
 
Cohen, Patricia (2009). Ivory Tower Unswayed by Crashing Economy. The New York Times, 
March 5. 
 
Coupé, Tom (2003). Revealed Performances: Worldwide Rankings of Economists and 
Economics Departments, 1990-2000, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(6): 
1309–1345. 
 
Farmer, Roger E. A. (1999). Macroeconomics. South-Western College Publishing: 
Cincinnati. 
 
Eichengreen, Barry (2009). The Last Temptation of Risk, The National Interest, May/June. 
 18 
 
Gordon, Robert J. (2009). Is Modern Macro or 1978era Macro More Relevant to the 
Understanding of the Current Economic Crisis? Unpublished paper, September 12, 
Northwestern University. 
 
Jones, Charles I. (2008). Macroeconomics. Norton: New York. 
 
Lucas, Robert E. (2004). My Keynesian Education. In: Michel DeVroey and Kevin D. Hoover 
(eds.) The IS-LM model: Its rise, fall and strange persistence. Annual supplement to vol. 36 
of History of Political Economy. 
 
Mankiw, Gregory N. (2006). Macroeconomics. 6th ed. Worth Publishers: New York. 
 
Romer, David (2000). Keynesian macroeconomics without the LM curve. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14(2):149–169. 
 
Siegfried, John J. (2010). Trends in Undergraduate Economics Degrees: 1991-2010. Journal
of Economic Education 41(3) (Summer): 320 330.  
 
Snyder, Thomas D. and Sally A. Dillow (2010). Digest of Education Statistics 2009 (NCES 
2010-013). National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. 
Department of Education. Washington, D.C. 
 
Taylor, John B. (2010). Macroeconomic Lessons from the Great Deviation. Remarks at the 
25th NBER Macro Annual Meeting, May.  
 
Walsh, Carl E. (2002)Teaching Inflation Targeting: An Analysis for Intermediate Macro. 
Journal of Economic Education 33(4), Fall: 333–347. 
 
Williamson, Stephen D. (2005). Macroeconomics. 2nd international ed. Pearson Addison 
Wesley: New York. 
 
Wolfers, Justin (2009). On the failure of macroeconomists. The New York Times, 
Freakonomics, January 28. Retrieved from http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/01/28/on-the-
failure-of-macroeconomists, March 24, 2011. 